I will be traveling to Canada’s Pacific coast in a couple of months to attend the bi-annual conference of the Canadian EU studies association. Among other things, I will participate in a panel on EU-Canada relations. The panel revisits last year's blog series on whether Canada should join the EU—a question now less fanciful than a year ago. My answer was no, it should not, because it cannot. If Canada cannot join the EU, another question arises however: how close can Canada get to the EU, assuming it wants to strengthen ties?

 In July 2025, the European Commission reached an agreement with the Trump administration to avert a potential trade war between two major global trading powers. The agreement, later called the ‘Turnberry deal’ because it was reached at the American president’s Scottish golf course, was one-sided. On the US side, it contained commitments not to raise tariffs further above a ceiling of 15%. On the EU side, it contained commitments to further lower tariffs on goods—in particular industrial goods, as well as certain agricultural goods such as, most notably, lobster.

On 17 June 2025, the European Commision adopted a legislative proposal to ban Russian gas imports into the EU. The proposal had a dual legal basis: Article 207 TFEU, concerning trade policy, and Article 194(2) TFEU, concerning energy policy. This was odd, considering that earlier efforts to reduce the import of Russian oil and coal were based on neither of these two TFEU provisions, but rather on Article 29 TEU, which concerns the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

On July 27th, 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and US President Donald Trump announced a new transatlantic trade deal. This agreement emerged from negotiations following the Trump administration’s imposition of historically high tariffs—levels not seen since World War II. While the deal has sparked extensive commentary on its strategic merits, less attention has been paid to its legal and constitutional form. This blog post argues that the EU-US deal exemplifies a troubling trend: executive-led decision-making that sidelines democratic institutions, particularly the European Parliament.

On 20 June 2025, the European Commission implemented measures under the International Procurement Instrument (IPI) for the first time since its introduction in 2022. The measures target medical devices from the People’s Republic of China (China). For at least the next five years, Chinese companies will be restricted from bidding on high-value tenders for medical devices such as X-ray machines, MRI scanners, and dental surgical instruments. By so doing, the Commission aims to pressure China to open its domestic procurement market for these devices to EU bidders. The first Commission implementing regulation imposing measures under the IPI offers an interesting insight into the tensions at the heart of this instrument. Can the EU gain access to foreign procurement markets by restricting access to its own?

The war in Gaza has placed the European Union in a difficult position. Since October 2023, Israel’s military operations have resulted in tens of thousands of Palestinian deaths. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has indicated that Israel may be violating the Genocide Convention. Human Rights Watch has gone further, asserting that Israel is committing genocide. This is not a distant issue for the EU. Israel is an important trading partner, with bilateral trade in goods reaching €42.6 billion in 2024. Services added another €25.6 billion. Israel also participates in Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research programme, receiving over €1.1 billion in funding between 2021 and 2024. The question is straightforward: What happens when a close trading partner is plausibly accused of genocide? More specifically, can national courts compel EU member states to act when EU institutions hesitate?

A point that may have been lost on non-US audiences watching in bewilderment at the US president’s tariff decisions is the constitutional basis of trade policy in the United States. Under the US Constitution, trade policy is not a power of the President. It is rather a power of Congress, responsible for regulating 'Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes'. So, why then does the president seem able to do whatever he wants in this space? And, given the unprecedented scope of the duties that have been imposed in recent weeks: has the US president gone too far?

Facing pressure from a US president who suggests Canada become the 51st state, Canada looks to Europe for new alliances. Historical ties and shared democratic values make Europe a natural partner. However, joining the EU is not feasible or advisable. Instead, Canada should adjust its economy and infrastructure to facilitate east-west trade rather than relying only on north-south routes.

In an earlier post, I noted that the new US administration's decisions create opportunities for Europe, especially in trade. For the EU to capitalize, it must adhere to its core values of democracy and the rule of law. This is both morally right and beneficial for the EU as it now looks to become the only major trading power upholding these principles.

About a month into Trump's second presidency, the wheels are already coming off. After threats to annex Greenland and Canada, the new US administration has begun direct negotiations with Russia, sidelining both Ukraine and other European leaders. At the Munich Security Conference, Vice President JD Vance stated that Europe's real enemy is internal liberal elites undermining democracy. This situation raises questions about the future of the Transatlantic alliance. Europe might now need to strategize independently, especially after recent US-Russia talks in Ryad, suggesting a potential alignment between the US and Russia.