The EU-US Trade Deal: The Devil is in the Implementation
In July 2025, the European Commission reached an agreement with the Trump administration to avert a potential trade war between two major global trading powers. The agreement, later called the ‘Turnberry deal’ because it was reached at the American president’s Scottish golf course, was one-sided. On the US side, it contained commitments not to raise tariffs further above a ceiling of 15%. On the EU side, it contained commitments to further lower tariffs on goods—in particular industrial goods, as well as certain agricultural goods such as, most notably, lobster.
The deal also contains commitments on the EU side to buy US military equipment and to purchase enormous amounts of gas from US suppliers. Furthermore, the deal contains commitments on the EU side to ‘work to address concerns’ of US producers that may be affected by the EU’s incoming Deforestation Regulation, as well as similar provisions regarding the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
The deal has been widely criticized. Then French Prime Minister Bayrou called the deal an act of submission of the European Union to the United States, while a former EU trade negotiator concluded the deal spelled the ‘end time for the EU’s common commercial policy.’ In its defence of the deal, the European Commission pointed to the importance of stability in transatlantic trade relations. Reports in the media also revealed that the Trump administration had linked approval of the unequal agreement to ongoing US backing for Ukraine’s defence. Faced with such coercion, the European Commission arguably had little choice but to accept the deal.
The deal was interesting not only for its content—it does not happen every day that the European Union, one of the world’s pre-eminent trade powers, is forced to accept an asymmetrical agreement—but also for its format and its subsequent implementation.
A non-binding agreement
Regarding the format: despite the frequent use of language that suggests an intention to incur binding commitments, the deal should be considered a non-binding agreement. The title—a ‘Joint Statement’—points in this direction, as does the process through which the agreement came into being. The EU can only conclude legally binding international agreements through the procedure laid down in Article 218 TFEU, which, for agreements in the area of trade, involves the Council and the European Parliament. This process has clearly not been followed for the EU-US Joint Statement.
Interestingly, however, the Commission does not seem to have followed the designated procedure for the conclusion of non-binding instruments (NBIs), either. Following CJEU case law, and as discussed in an earlier post, Council and Commission have set up arrangements to enable the Council to approve or reject non-binding agreements that involve policy-making. Clearly, this would be such an agreement. There is no sign, however, that the NBI process has been followed.
Implementation through legislation
By contrast, the Commission did commit to involving Council and Parliament in the implementation of the deal. It has done so by adopting two legislative proposals (here and here), which Council and Parliament as co-legislators are asked to consider. Contrary to long-standing practice, the Commission did not organize any impact assessment prior to adopting the proposals, which seems in tension with the Commission’s own Better Lawmaking agenda.
The proposals, which have been adopted late August and are currently being considered by both institutions, translate the promises made by the Commission with regard to tariff reductions into EU law. They do not say anything about other aspects of the deal, such as the investment promises, or the promises to ‘work’ on existing EU regulations to better suit US companies and exporters.
The Commission empowers itself
In addition to their substantive provisions concerning tariff reductions, both legislative proposals also contain suspension mechanisms, empowering the European Commission to suspend the tariff reductions in case the US does not deliver on its own promises in the EU-US deal.
The trigger for application of the suspension mechanisms is remarkably broad. In particular, if the proposals are adopted, the Commission will be able to suspend the reductions inter alia where ‘the United States fails to implement the Joint Statement or otherwise undermines the objectives pursued by the Joint Statement’, or ‘undermines access of Union economic operators to the United States market’, or otherwise ‘disrupts the trade and investment relationship between the Union and the United States.’ These are broad triggers indeed, and the proposals do not further define what is meant by ‘undermining’ or ‘. The Commission can moreover suspend the tariff reductions on its own initiative. Member States can veto the decision, but to do so they must do by means of a qualified majority, which is a high threshold. If the EU Member States are divided, the Commission ultimately prevails.
By adding an open-ended suspension option to both legislative proposals, the Commission is sending a message to the US administration that it can also use this tactic, even though the current procedures for adopting implementing acts will still slow down the Commission's actions.
However, if the Commission’s stated intention was to reintroduce predictability in transatlantic trade, this type of suspension mechanism does not help. At the same time, faced with as unpredictable a counterpart as Donald Trump, it would be just as foolish to tie your own hands, when you know very well that the other side does not care particularly much about keeping promises. (It is telling, in this regard, that only days after the deal was reached, the US administration imposed additional tariffs on over 400 products that allegedly contain steel or aluminium.)
Searching for silver linings
If anything, the proposed suspension mechanism, which has been accepted by the 27 Member States at a Council meeting late November 2025, points to the dangers of the Trump approach to international deal-making contaminating other trading powers, and thereby contributing to a further erosion of the rules-based international trading system.
While there may be wisdom in fighting fire with fire, it is also important that the EU continue to live up to its stated promises of remaining a reliable trading partner that remains supportive of international dispute settlement mechanisms. The EU has a lot to lose—and little to gain—from trying to emulate US foreign policy practices. It is not particularly skilled at strongarming trading partners into accepting EU terms, even if it tries to do so increasingly often, as most recently in the discussions surrounding the upcoming Return Regulation, where the EU is considering making continued EU market access contingent on the acceptance of returnees. At the same time, the Trump administration offers the EU an important competitive advantage as a reliable trading partner that will not suddenly cut off trade in pursuit of non-trade objectives.
Mindful of these two points, one can only hope that in addition to managing Trump, the EU continues to actively reach out to other trading partners than the US to revive efforts to strengthen the multilateral trading system. In times of Trump induced trade chaos dominating news and social media channels, it is easy to forget that the US represents only a small share of global trade, and that the vast majority of other trading powers remain committed to rules-based international trade. Linking the EU to the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), as urged by industry groups, could be a noteworthy move toward achieving this goal. If the US administration’s coercive trade tactics end up encouraging the rest of the world to revive trade multilateralism, that would be an unexpected silver lining.
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