How Federalism Shapes Critical Minerals Policy in Canada and the EU

This week I’m in Victoria, BC, for the 2026 ECSA‑C Biennial Conference, where I’ll be presenting a new paper titled “Strategic Minerals, Divided Powers: Resource Federalism and Economic Security in Canada and the EU.” I thought I’d use this space to briefly introduce the paper and explain what I’ll be talking about on the panel.

Over the past few years, economic security has become a central theme in policy debates. Governments want to reduce strategic dependencies, strengthen supply chains, and avoid situations where interdependence can be used as leverage. This shift is often described in terms of three pillars: promote (industrial strategy), protect (screening and safeguards), and partner (working with like‑minded countries).

Both Canada and the EU are active under all three pillars, and the policy landscape is evolving quickly. Critical raw materials—lithium, cobalt, rare earths—are right at the centre of this agenda. They’re essential for the green transition and advanced manufacturing, and they’re also highly concentrated in a small number of countries. So it’s no surprise that both Canada and the EU are trying to secure access and accelerate project development.

What my paper does is look at something that hasn’t received much attention: how this economic security agenda interacts with the federal structures of Canada and the EU. Many of the tools needed to act on economic security sit at the subnational level (or, in the EU’s case, the Member State level), which means that constitutional arrangements matter a great deal.

To make sense of this, I use a simple distinction between self‑rule and shared rule. Canada is usually seen as a system that emphasizes self‑rule—each level of government has its own sphere of autonomy. The EU, by contrast, is often described as emphasizing shared rule—governments act together through common institutions.

This distinction helps explain why Canada and the EU approach critical minerals so differently.

• In the EU, the Critical Raw Materials Act creates a structured, multilateral approach. Member States work together in a CRM Board, coordinate on strategic projects, and operate within binding timelines and requirements. It’s cooperative, but it also constrains individual autonomy.

• In Canada, collaboration is much more decentralized. Ottawa works with provinces through bilateral agreements—mostly MoUs—which are non‑binding and depend on political will. Provinces retain control over natural resources, and there is no pan‑Canadian institutional structure comparable to the EU’s CRM Board.

The result is two very different governance models. Neither is better or worse; they simply reflect different constitutional realities. But these differences matter, especially as Canada and the EU deepen their cooperation on critical minerals.

The main takeaway of the paper is that economic security strategies don’t override federalism. If anything, they make federal structures more visible, because the pressure to coordinate is higher. And if Canada and the EU want to work together effectively, they need a clear understanding of each other’s constitutional constraints—who can do what, and on what terms.

That’s the core of what I’ll be discussing at the conference. If you’re attending ECSA‑C and want to talk about the paper—or about federalism, critical minerals, or economic security more broadly—I’d be very happy to chat. If you’re interested in reading the conference paper, send me a message using the contact form!